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On November 30, 1993, President Clinton signed a law, com-
monly referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," which bans homosexu-
als from openly serving in the armed forces.' Though it was not the
first military policy to discriminate against homosexuals,2 it is the con-
trolling law today. Since being signed into law, the constitutionality
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" has been challenged in the courts on vari-
ous grounds, and each challenge has failed.4
Recently, a number of complaints have been filed in district courts
around the country questioning the constitutionality of the military's
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas.5 This Comment will examine
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1 See Lyle Denniston & Richard H.P. Sia, Bill on Gays in Military Quietly Signed into Law, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 14, 1993, at 10A ("On Nov. 30, with no White House ceremony and with Mr. Clin-
ton's aides issuing only a one-paragraph press release that escaped notice, the president signed
into law the bill that endorses most of his so-called 'don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue' policy.").
2 See C. Dixon Osburn, A Policy in Desperate Search of a Rationale: The Military's Policy on Lesbi-
ans, Gays and Bisexuals, 64 UMKC L. REv. 199, 203-09 (1995) (discussing military policy towards
homosexuals prior to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").
3 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (dictating military policy towards homosexuals).
See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631-36 (2d Cir. 1998) (challenging 10 U.S.C.
§ 654 under equal protection); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132-36 (9th
Cir. 1997) (challenging 10 U.S.C. § 654 under equal protection, substantive due process, and
the First Amendment); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1424-30 (9th Cir. 1997) (challenging 10
U.S.C. § 654 under equal protection and the First Amendment); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d
256, 260-63 (8th Cir. 1996) (challenging 10 U.S.C. § 654 under due process and the First
Amendment); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 927-33 (4th Cir. 1996) (challenging 10 U.S.C.
§ 654 under equal protection and the First Amendment); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260,
263-67 (D. Md. 1995) (same).
5 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see, e.g., Complaint at 4, 34-35, Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d
385 (D. Mass. 2006) (No. 04-12546-GAO), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/
SLDNARTICLES/pdffile/1957.pdf (arguing that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is unconstitutional
in light of Lawrence v. Texas); Complaint at 2-3, Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. CV
04-8425 GPS (ex) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2004), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-
data/SLDNARTICLES/pdffile/1871.pdf (same). The district court in Cook v. Runmfeld ap-
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the role that Lawrence should play in invalidating "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell., 6 In Part I, I provide an introduction to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
and the previous challenges to that law, which will serve as a back-
drop in future challenges. In Part II, I will examine the Court's deci-
sion in Lawrence. The majority invalidated the Texas statute criminal-
izing sodomy in Lawrence based on a violation of due process, but the
scope of the liberty interest identified and the standard of review that
the Court utilized are both ambiguous. I examine the Court's lan-
guage for some clarity on these subjects, ultimately concluding that
the Court in Lawrence recognized a fundamental right. In Part III, I
discuss another case, United States v. Marcum,' in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) determined
that Lawrence was applicable in the military context. Though Marcum
involved a prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
the Court's opinion is enlightening because it considers the unique
circumstances of military life before developing a test to determine
the circumstances under which Lawrence should apply to military
prosecutions. In Part IV, I build on the discussions in Parts II and III
in analyzing the constitutionality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." I argue
that the acts prong of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" infringes on the fun-
damental liberty interest identified in Lawrence. I further argue that,
though the Court affords Congress great deference in reviewing mili-
tary regulations, the reasons provided for this deference apply equally
well to the decisions of the C.A.A.F. For this reason, the Court
should integrate decisions made by the C.A.A.F. into its balancing.
Taking all of this into consideration, I ultimately conclude that the
Supreme Court should find the acts prong of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
unconstitutional in many circumstances, and therefore, should find
the statements prong unconstitutional.8
I. INTRODUCTION
The military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is codified at 10
U.S.C. § 654. This statute requires that a member of the armed
plied rational basis review. 429 F. Supp. 2d at 395-97. However, I believe that case was wrongly
decided. See infra Part II.
6 This Comment will focus on the constitutionality of the "acts" prong and the resulting
ramifications to the "statements" prong should the Court determine that the "acts" prong of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is unconstitutional. Because of the tenuous status of same-sex marriage
in the United States, this Comment will assume that 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (3) is constitutional. See
Wyatt Buchanan, Profound Issues in Seattle Lawsuit State High Court Set to Rule on Gay Rights, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 3, 2006, at Al ("Thirty-nine states in all bar same-sex marriage, 18 have enacted
constitutional bans and in some states both laws and the constitution bar same-sex marriage.").
7 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
8 See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text for an explanation of what the "acts" and
.statements" prongs are.
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forces be "separated" from the military if one or more of the follow-
ing findings are made:
(1) [t]hat the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or so-
licited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are
further findings... that the member has demonstrated that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and cus-
tomary behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of
the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts.
(2) [t]hat the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding.., that
the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who en-
gages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends
to engage in homosexual acts.
(3) [t]hat the member has married or attempted to marry a person
known to be of the same biological sex.9
When examining this policy, courts often refer to 10 U.S.C.
§ 654(b) (1) as the "acts prong" and 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2) as the
"statements prong."' ° In previous suits, the acts prong has been chal-
lenged primarily on the basis that it violates the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
The courts have uniformly held that rational basis is the proper stan-
dard of review for evaluating equal 2protection claims against laws that
discriminate against homosexuals,' often noting that the laws passed
by Congress regarding the military are entitled to deference by the
courts. Previous cases have challenged the statements prong on the
9 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
1o E.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1997) (using "acts
prong" and "statements prong" terminology).
1 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying equal protection
analysis to 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)); Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1132 (same); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d
1420, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 927 (4th Cir. 1996)
(applying equal protection analysis to 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)).
See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 631-32 (applying rational basis review); Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425
(same); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927-28 (same). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580
(2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When a law exhibits.., a desire to harm a politically un-
popular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such
laws under the Equal Protection Clause.") (emphasis added).
13 See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 633 ("Deference by the courts to military-related judgments by
Congress... is deeply recurrent in Supreme Court caselaw.... ."); Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425
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basis that it violates the First Amendment.14 Courts have rejected this
argument, finding it rational to assume that a homosexual will en-
gage in homosexual conduct, thereby violating the acts prong." A
service person's statements concerning his or her homosexual orien-
tation, thus, can be used as probative evidence of a propensity or in-
tention to engage in proscribed conduct; therefore, the constitution-
ality of the statements prong relies on the acts prong being
constitutional. 6
II. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
the case of two men convicted of engaging in "deviate sexual inter-
course" in violation of a Texas statute making homosexual acts ille-
gal.'7 The Court granted certiorari to consider three separate ques-
tions: (1) whether the Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it made certain acts illegal
only when committed by same-sex couples; (2) whether the Texas
laws violated their "vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;" and (3)
whether it should overrule Bowers v. Hardwick.'s The majority decided
to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,19 concluding that "Bowers was not cor-
(stating that the judiciary should defer to Congress in matters relating to the military); Thomas-
son, 80 F.3d at 925-27 (stating that Congress is entitled to deference when courts scrutinize the
constitutionality of laws regulating military affairs); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 507 (1986) (" [R] eview of military regulations ... is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 70 (1981) ("[Jludicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their
governance is challenged.").
1 See, e.g., Philips, 106 F.3d at 1429-30 (challenging 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) under the First
Amendment); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931-34 (same); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1292-
1300 (2d Cir. 1996) (reviewing the district court's decision that 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) violates
the First Amendment).
is E.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932 ("[A] service member's statement that he is a homosexual
has substantial evidentiary value regarding whether he has a propensity to engage in homosex-
ual acts .... ."). It has been argued that punishing a member of the military for admitting that
he has a homosexual orientation discriminates unconstitutionally on the basis of status rather
than conduct. Such an interpretation was rejected prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1298 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing district court's holding that the stat-
ute discriminates based on status).
16 See Able, 155 F.3d at 631 ("'[I]f the acts prohibition of subsection (b) (1) is constitu-
tional.., the statements presumption of subsection (b) (2) does not violate the First Amend-
ment,' because the 'subsections rise or fall together.'") (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Able, 88 F.3d at 1292, 1296).
17 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
Is Id. at 564.
19 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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rect when it was decided, and it is not correct today."20 The majority
further stated that the Texas statute violated the rights of the peti-
tioners under the Due Process Clause, 2' though the level of scrutiny
used by the majority in reaching that conclusion is unclear.22
A. Due Process Under Lawrence
1. The Standard of Review
In cases regarding due process and equal protection, the Court
has often made an explicit statement specifying the standard of re-
view employed. 2  The absence of such a statement in Lawrence has
created confusion about the level of scrutiny that should be applied
by lower courts in deciding cases regarding discrimination against
homosexuals. Some have argued that the Court was applying strict
scrutiny because it was protecting a fundamental right.24 Others have
interpreted Lawrence as requiring only rational basis review.5 Both
arguments have found supporting evidence in the Lawrence decision.
The Court began its analysis by stating that "the case should be re-
solved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to
engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under
the Due Process Clause . 2...,,2' The Court then discussed the evolu-
tion of its recognition of the right to privacy,27 citing Griswold v. Con-
necticut,28 Eisenstadt v. Baird,29 Roe v. Wade,30 and Carey v. Population Ser-
vices Internationals' The Court explained that it was citing these
opinions because "[b] oth Eisenstadt and Carey, as well as the holding
20 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
21 Id. at 578-79.
2 See Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394 n.1l (D. Mass. 2006) ("[T]he Court did
not explicitly state what standard of review it was using.").
23 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926 (1992) ("Our prece-
dents and the joint opinion's principles require us to subject all non-de-minimis abortion regula-
tions to strict scrutiny."). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental
Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1917 (2004) ("To search for the
magic words proclaiming the right protected.., to be 'fundamental,' and to assume that in the
absence of those words mere rationality review applied, is to universalize what is in fact only an
occasional practice.").
24 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 23 (arguing that the Court recognized a fundamental right to
form homosexual relationships).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2004) ("In Lawrence, the
Court did not expressly identify the liberty interest as a fundamental right. Therefore, we will
not presume the existence of such a fundamental right... ").
26 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
27 Id. at 564-66.
28 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
30 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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and rationale in Roe, confirmed that the reasoning of Griswold could
not be confined to the protection of rights of married adults. ' s The
Court continued by admonishing its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
stating:
The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as follows: "The
issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamen-
tal right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy .... " That statement,
we now conclude, discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the ex-
tent of the liberty at stake. 34
The Court continued by analogizing a homosexual relationship to
that of a married couple. To characterize the rights of homosexuals
as simply the right to engage in sodomy, the Court commanded, is
demeaning'to those individuals and akin to distilling a marriage into
"the right to have sexual intercourse.
The Court's language in Lawrence is instructive of its intentions.
Though the statute in question only outlawed a sexual act,3 6 the Court
described its purpose as seeking to prevent homosexuals from form-
ing intimate relationships. The Court rebuked laws against sodomy
for attempting to "control a personal relationship" akin to that of a
married heterosexual couple.38 Homosexuals routinely enter into
committed personal relationships with each other,39 and laws such as
the Texas statute challenged in Lawrence4° effectively make those rela-
tionships a crime. 4' The Court recognized that "whether or not enti-
tled to formal recognition in the law," those relationships were pro-
tected under the Constitution as a liberty interest.42 The Court was
consistent in its language, relying on privacy cases invoking strict
scrutiny to invalidate a law that touched "upon the most private hu-
32 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566 (2003). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 ("The pre-
sent case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fun-
damental constitutional guarantees.").
33 See id. ("The facts in Bowers had some similarities to the instant case.").
Id. at 566-67 (citation omitted).
s Id. at 567.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (2003), invalidated by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (defining
homosexual conduct as a Class C misdemeanor).
37 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
3 Id.
39 There were over 600,000 same-sex unmarried partner households living in the United
States in 2000. DAVID M. SMITH & GARYJ. GATES, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS 4 (Aug. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000491.gl-partner-households.pdf.
40 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (stating that, in 2003, thirteen states prohibited sodomy).
41 The Court recognized that sodomy is a physical manifestation of homosexual relation-
ships, but was careful to distinguish between the two. See id. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a per-
sonal bond that is more enduring.") (emphasis added).
42 Id.
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man conduct.., in the most private of places .... This suggests
that the Court was utilizing strict scrutiny in its decision.
Justice Scalia goes to great lengths in his dissent to establish that
there is no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy." However, the
majority expressly stated that the error of Bowers was exactly that.
That is, the Court analyzed the Bowers case by determining if there
was a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, and that
very framing of the issue itself "discloses the Court's own failure to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake."45 Justice Scalia repeat-
edly noted that fundamental rights must be "'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."' Yet, this is not inconsistent with the
conclusion that Lawrence recognized a fundamental right.
2. The Scope of the Liberty Interest in Lawrence
As a preliminary matter, it is critical to identify the scope of the
liberty interest identified in Lawrence, for the level of generality with
which a right is defined is often an outcome-determinative issue.47 As
Tribe and Dorf explained in Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, Justice Scalia argues in footnote 6 of Michael H. v. Gerald D.
that the level of specificity with which a right should be recognized is
"the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."4 Even if
this dictum is accepted as the proper standard by which to delineate
constitutional rights, its deceptively simple standard ignores the
complexity that necessarily follows in its application. The most obvi-
ous problem with this standard is that "reasonable people can dis-
agree about the content of particular traditions, and.., they can dis-
agree even about which traditions are relevant to the definition of
'liberty' . . . . 49 Similarly, if there is no societal tradition regarding
the specific issue being considered by the Court, there is no single
correct method for expanding the analysis of traditions to the next
most specific level.
43 Id.
Id. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia goes so far as to suggest that the con-
straint on liberty posed by anti-sodomy laws is equivalent to that posed by laws against prostitu-
tion and heroin use. Id. at 592.
45 Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
46 See, e.g., id. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)).
47 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1066 (1990) (explaining that the majority and dissent came to different legal
conclusion in Bowers because they defined "the right at issue" differently).
48 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1988). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
joined in all ofJustice Scalia's opinion except for footnote 6. Id. at 112.
Id. at 137 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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For example, in Michael H., Justice Scalia argues that if there was
no tradition "regarding the rights of the natural father of a child
adulterously conceived," the Court should look to the rights of natu-
ral fathers generally." However, legal problems are rarely, if ever,
one dimensional, as Justice Scalia's assertion implicitly assumes.
Tribe and Doff argued that, in this example, one could legitimately
decide to ignore the gender of the parent rather than whether the
child was conceived through adultery and examine instead the paren-
tal rights of children adulterously conceived.5' Such a problem would
almost always be present in evaluating the rights protected by tradi-
tion because the issue before the Court can always be sufficiently nar-
rowly framed as to preclude the existence of a tradition regarding it.
Ultimately, the Court must make a value judgment in determining
how abstractly rights should be defined.5 ' Thus, a better approach for
the Court would be to look at the rationales behind existing cases
and traditions and determine if they apply to the case before it. '
With this in mind, I turn back to Justice Scalia's assertion that the
majority in Lawrence could not have recognized a fundamental right
because there was no such right that was "deeply rooted" in this
country's "history and tradition." In Lawrence, the majority identified
a liberty interest, not in a sexual act, but in the formation of intimate
personal relationships, whether homosexual or heterosexual. 54 It is
because statutes that prohibit acts of sodomy "seek to control" those
relationships, in the case of homosexuals, that they are invalid. 5
Though Justice Scalia pointed out that sodomy does not meet the re-
quirements for a fundamental right, the right to form an intimate
personal relationship with another is a right "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."
The right of heterosexuals to form such personal relationships has
long been protected through the right to, marry. 56 Though the right
to marry is distinct from the liberty interest identified in Lawrence, it
was the marriage relationship to which the majority in Lawrence
50 Id. at 128 n.6 (majority opinion).
51 Tribe & Dorf, supra note 47, at 1090.
52 Id. at 1099.
53 Id. at 1101-02.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) ("Persons in a homosexual relationship
may seek autonomy for these purposes [e.g. personal decisions relating to family relationships],
just as heterosexual persons do.").
55 Id. at 567.
56 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (describing marriage "as creating the most
important relation in life"); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("[T]he right
to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.").
57 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (implying that homosexual rela-
tionships are not entitled to formal recognition in the law through marriage).
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analogized the relationship in Bowers.8 This does not mean that the
right identified in Lawrence extends to same-sex marriage. Indeed,
the Court noted explicitly that it was not addressing same-sex mar-
riage. 9 The fact that homosexuals have been denied the fundamen-
tal right to form intimate personal relationships in the past does not
mean that such a fundamental right does not exist. Here, the level of
generality at which the Court defines a right becomes important. If
broadly generalized, historical traditions can be cited to support
propositions to which they bear no relation. For example, Tribe and
Dorf observed that prior to the industrialization of this country, there
were no minimum wage laws.60 Yet, the historical absence of such
laws does not indicate that when such laws were passed, they in-
fringed upon a fundamental right to work for small sums of money.6'
Rather, minimum wage laws did not exist before industrialization be-
62cause there was no need for them.
"Conversely, the presence of positive laws encroaching upon a
right does not negate the fundamentality of that right."63 One need
only look at this country's historical treatment of interracial marriage
for proof of this axiom. Prior to 1948, many states had laws banning
64interracial marriage. In 1948, California was the first state to hold
its anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional, with a number of
other states following suit shortly thereafter. 5  In 1967, the United
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Loving v. Virginia, which
held that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute violated the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution.66 Simultaneously, the Court
recognized a fundamental right to marry, which extended to interra-
cial couples.6 7 The fact that this country had a historical tradition of
prohibiting interracial marriage did not prevent the Court from de-
termining that a fundamental right to marriage existed or that such a
right extended to interracial couples.
Although Lovingwas the first time that the Court had ruled on the
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting interracial marriage,68 its past
58 Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
59 See id. at 578 ("[The present case] does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.").
60 Tribe & Dorf, supra note 47, at 1088.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (listing states that had bans on interracial
marriage and states that had repealed their bans).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 12.
67 See id. ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very exis-
tence and survival.").
68 Id. at 2.
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rulings were not consistent with the existence of a fundamental right
to marry.69 To deny that a fundamental right could be recognized in
Lawrence because "a right to engage in homosexual sodomy [is] not
"'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition ..... 0 is equivalent
to saying that there could be no fundamental right recognized in Lov-
ing because a right to interracial marriage is not deeply rooted in this•• 71
Nation's history or tradition. In both cases, the critical issue be-comes the level of specificity with which a right is protected.
3. Lawrence Recognized a Fundamental Right
The rationales of the privacy cases cited by the Court at the be-
ginning of the Lawrence opinion are consistent with protecting a fun-
damental right to forming intimate associations. In Griswold, the
Court objected to a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives be-
cause it forbade "the use of contraceptives rather than regulating
their manufacture or sale. This prohibition extended to married
people.73 Because the statute regulated the private and intimate be-
havior of married people, the Court held that it was destructive to
their relationships and therefore violated their fundamental privacy
rights.74 In Eisenstadt, the Court expanded the protection granted in
Griswold to unmarried people under a similar rationale. 75 However, in
Eisenstadt the Court clarified that "the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity."76 The right to privacy of married individuals derives
from each individual's right to privacy.7 Each individual's right to
form private, intimate relationships is protected by their right to pri-
vacy, which extends to "the decision whether to bear or beget a
69 See infra note 71.
70 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
71 If anything, there is a history and tradition of anti-miscegenation in this country. In Pace
v. Alabama, the Court upheld an Alabama statute that punished interracial fornication more
severely than another statute prohibiting fornication between non-interracial couples. 106 U.S.
583 (1883). The statute in question also prohibited interracial marriage, ALA. CODE § 4189
(1876), though the Court did not address the constitutionality of that issue. Pace, 106 U.S. at
584-85. Prior to Loving, the Court similarly signaled its approval of anti-miscegenation laws
through its passive acceptance of them. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 195 (1964)
(failing to "reach[] the question of the validity of [Florida's] prohibition against interracial
marriage"); State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 9 (1872) (allowing indictment of interracial couple mar-
ried in Mississippi for violating Tennessee miscegenation law), cited with approval in Yarborough
v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 218 n.10 (1933) (Stone,J., dissenting).
72 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (emphasis in original).
73 Id. at 480.
74 Id. at 485.
75 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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child. '78 The Court used similar reasoning in the plurality opinion of
Carey,79 though it applied a lower level of scrutiny in that case because
the challenged law involved minors."' In Roe, the Court extended its
reasoning, deciding that because pregnancy impacts a woman's life so
profoundly, an individual's right to privacy extends to the decision of
whether to have an abortion. However, the Court noted that in the
case of abortion, the state has a countervailing interest in the "protec-
tion of health, medical standards, and prenatal life" that must be bal-
anced against a woman's right to an abortion."
The rationales of these cases are wholly consistent with the Court's
holding in Lawrence that a fundamental right exists to form intimate
personal relationships under the penumbra of privacy. In both Gris-
wold and Eisenstadt, the Court determined that the right to privacy
encompassed the right to use contraceptives because it interfered
with the underlying right to form intimate relationships free from
governmental interference. Carey and Roe help to limit the scope of
the right; thus, these cases can be used to explain why the right does
not necessarily extend to protect same-sex marriage. In both Carey
and Roe, individual privacy rights were balanced against significant
state interests. In Carey, the Court considered "the States' greater lati-
tude to regulate the conduct of children" and the fact that children
are less capable of making important decisions, which the privacy
right in that case demanded. In Roe, the Court weighed the state's
interest in "safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards,
and in protecting potential life., 8 4  Same-sex marriage likewise in-
volves ancillary state interests that were not present in Lawrence. Law-
rence was about private, intimate conduct. The other privacy cases
cited by the Court likewise involved private behavior. However, mar-
riage is by no means private. Marriage creates a legal status that be-
stows state and federal legal rights upon the parties entering into it. 5
78 Id.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (noting Griswold and Eisenstadt).
80 Id. at 693 & n.15 (1977) ("State restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid
only if they serve 'any significant state interest....' This test is apparently less rigorous than
the 'compelling state interest' test applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults.") (quot-
ing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)). The Court in Law-
rence specifically distinguished its case from a case applying to minors, stating "[t]he present
case does not involve minors." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
81 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
82 Id. at 155.
83 Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15.
84 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
85 See, e.g., Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Associate General Counsel, U.S. General Accounting
Office, to Bill Frist, U.S. Senate Majority Leader (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (noting that there are 1,138 federal statutory pro-
visions "in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privi-
leges").
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The operation of law is generally considered public. 6 Marriage li-
censes themselves become part of the public record. 7 In short, the
rationales of the cases cited by the majority in Lawrence support the
Court's holding that a fundamental right exists to form personal, in-
timate relationships, but those rationales would not necessarily ex-
tend to support the recognition of same-sex marriage.
Thus, to say that the right to form intimate relationships has been
protected among heterosexuals through marriage is not to say that
the right to form intimate relationships is identical to the right to
marriage. Rather, each is a distinct right. The relationship between
these two rights can be analogized to an insulated wire. The wire
represents the relationship, while the surrounding insulation repre-
sents marriage. A wire can conduct electricity between two points re-
gardless of whether or not it has insulation. Similarly, a relationship
can exist between two people outside of marriage. The insulation
provides protection to the wire and the current that it carries, shield-
ing it from interference, but both exist separately with different
properties. Marriage likewise provides legal protections and stability
to a relationship.8 Just as one would not look at an insulated wire
and see only the insulation, one cannot look at marriage and ignore
the underlying relationship the Court has sought to protect with its
decisions. The privacy cases cited by the Lawrence Court centered
their rationales on this relationship, rather than its formal, legal rec-
ognition through marriage. Thus, it makes sense that, just as the
Court in Loving recognized that marriage was a fundamental right
that had been denied to interracial couples, the Court in Lawrence
recognized that the right to form intimate personal relationships was
a right that had been denied to homosexuals. 8
Still, it should be noted that the majority in Lawrence also stated
that "[t] he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
86 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12-18 (1948) (distinguishing between a private
covenant, which is beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, and enforcement of that
covenant through judicial means, which is not).
87 See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 761
(1989) (listing marriage licenses as an example of information contained in the public record).
88 See Hernandez v. Robles, Nos. 86-89, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836, at *7 (N.Y. July 6, 2006)
("[A]n important function of marriage is to create more stability and permanence in the rela-
tionships that cause children to be born.").
89 Both Loving and Lawrence are stories of forbidden love transcending their artificial
boundaries. Stories such as these are themselves engrained in our country's history and cul-
ture. See, e.g., WILLIAM BENEMANN, MALE-MALE INTIMACY IN EARLY AMERICA: BEYOND ROMANTIC
FRIENDSHIPS (2006) (describing male homosexual relationships in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century America); GARY NASH, FORBIDDEN LOVE: THE SECRET HISTORY OF MIXED-RACE AMERICA
82-83 (1999) (describing interracial couples such as William G. Allen and Mary King, who mar-
ried in early America despite social pressures to the contrary); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO
ANDJULIET (describing two lovers separated because of their last names).
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justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individ-
ual." Many have pointed to this sentence as evidence that the Court
was utilizing rational basis review.91 Yet, the mere use of the word "le-
gitimate" alone does not necessarily mean that rational basis is the
appropriate standard of review. 92 Just as opinions applying strict scru-
tiny usually refer to "compelling" interests that are "narrowly tai-
lored,"93 opinions applying rational basis review typically inquire as to
whether laws are "rationally related" to "legitimate" state interests.
94
Interestingly, the only time the majority opinion used the word "ra-
tional"9 5 was to describe the Court's holding in Romer v. Evans.96 The
ambiguity of the standard of review in the Lawrence decision was dis-
cussed at length by the C.A.A.F. in United States v. Marcum.9y
While the C.A.A.F. ultimately decided that the liberty interest dis-
cussed in Lawrence did not represent a fundamental right in the mili-
tary context, the court expressly stated that it only did so because the
Supreme Court did not "expressly identify" a fundamental right in
Lawrence.9 This decision should be viewed as a sign of caution on the
part of the C.A.A.F. rather than an endorsement of an interpretation
90 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (emphasis added).
91 See, e.g., id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that, because the Court stated that "the
Texas statute 'furthers no legitimate state interest,'" it was applying rational basis review, albeit
"an unheard-of form of rational-basis review"); Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232,
1236 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he Lawrence opinion ... ultimately applied rational-basis review,
rather than strict scrutiny, to the challenged statute." (citing Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2004))).
92 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating "the
State of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest-to say nothing of a compel-
ling one" and arguing strict scrutiny should be applied).
93 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) ("[B]ecause the University's use of
race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents'
asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection
Clause .... ."); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our opinions applying
the doctrine known as 'substantive due process' hold that the Due Process Clause prohibits
States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest."(citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997))).
94 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) ("States may discriminate on
the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in ques-
tion is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.") (emphasis added); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant
to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
95 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (majority opinion) ("We concluded that the provision was
'born of animosity toward the class of persons affected' and further that it had no rational rela-
tion to a legitimate governmental purpose." (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634
(1996))).
96 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
97 United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 204-05 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
98 See id. at 205 ("[W]e will not presume the existence of such a fundamental right in the
military environment when the Supreme Court declined in the civilian context to expressly
identify such a fundamental right.").
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of Lawrence where the Court utilized rational basis review. This con-
clusion becomes obvious when a similar, hypothetical case is consid-
ered. Suppose that the Supreme Court decided another case with an
ambiguous standard of review, only this time, the Court was actually
utilizing rational basis review. The issue decided in such a case comes
before the C.A.A.F. and they are asked to determine whether to apply
rational basis review or strict scrutiny. Were they to decide to apply
strict scrutiny, a rather perverse result ensues once the Supreme
Court clarifies its standard of review. A constitutional right would ex-
ist that would be fundamental in the military context, but only subject
to rational basis review in the civilian context. If anything, the consti-
tutional rights of members of the military should be more restricted
than the rights of civilians because of the special needs of military so-
ciety.99 Thus, to prevent such a result, the C.A.A.F. would have to re-
spond to an ambiguous Supreme Court opinion in the manner in
which it did. That is, it would apply rational basis review while noting
that the Supreme Court did not explicitly indicate that a fundamental
right existed.
While some evidence exists indicating that the Court utilized ra-
tional basis review in Lawrence, a careful examination of that evidence
reveals its flaws. After a comprehensive analysis of the opinion, it be-
comes clear that the Court identified a fundamental liberty interest
in forming intimate, personal relationships.
B. Equal Protection in Lawrence
Although the Court expressly stated that it had granted certiorari
to consider three questions, 10 the majority opinion had very little to
say about whether the Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Devoting a single paragraph to the issue, the Court stated that "the
instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continu-
ing validity. Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be
valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between
same-sex and different-sex participants."'0 ' Justice O'Connor, in her
concurrence, was the only Justice to decide that the challenged stat-
ute violated the Equal Protection Clause. °2 However, that does not
mean that the majority determined that the statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Quite the contrary, the majority character-
See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974) (distinguishing military law from that ap-
plicable to civilians).
100 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
101 Id. at 575.
102 Id. at 585 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
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ized an equal protection challenge to the Texas statute as "a tenable
argument."00 The majority simply declined to rule on the issue with
respect to the Equal Protection Clause because such a ruling would
not prohibit states from passing statutes prohibiting sodomy so long
as they applied to both heterosexuals and homosexuals. 10 4 While Jus-
tice O'Connor felt that such a law "would not long stand in our de-
mocratic society," 0 5 the majority disagreed.1 0 6  By failing to address
the equal protection challenge to the law, the Court declined the op-
portunity to determine that homosexuals constituted a protected or
quasi-protected class entitled to heightened scrutiny.' °
Where "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinar-
ily to be relied upon to protect minorities," the Court may utilize "a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry" in reviewing laws-- - - 108
challenged under equal protection. Such is the case with homo-
sexuals. 9Homosexuals are discrete and insular 1 minorities who
are victimized by prejudice through the political process which is
supposed to protect them.1 2 Recognizing that the Texas sodomy law
103 Id. at 574 (majority opinion).
104 Id. at 575.
105 Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106 See id. at 575 (declining to rule on equal protection grounds because such a ruling would
not Protect homosexuals from a law against sodomy that applied equally to heterosexuals).
10 Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 437 (1985) ("Concluding
that no fundamental fight was implicated and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor
a quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum level of judicial scrutiny appli-
cable to equal protection claims."). In prior cases adjudicating the constitutionality of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," the circuit courts applied rational basis review because the Supreme Court has
heretofore declined to apply heightened scrutiny to classification based on sexual orientation.
See cases cited supra note 12.
108 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (declining to deter-
mine whether prejudice against minorities constitutes a special condition); cf In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (holding that aliens as a class are discrete and insular minorities, that such
classifications "'are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny'" (quoting Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971))).
109 See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that homo-
sexuals constitute a suspect class warranting strict scrutiny); Jeffrey A. Williams, Re-Orienting the
Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 14 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 131,
142-48 (2005) (arguing that classification based on sexual orientation should be entitled to
strict scrutiny because homosexuals are a suspect class).
110 See Andrew J. Seligsohn, Choosing Liberty Over Equality and Sacrificing Both: Equal Protection
and Due Process in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 411, 418 (2004) ("[Bly identify-
ing a 'homosexual agenda' Scalia suggests that gays and lesbians might be a discrete minority."
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985), denying cert. to 730
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and
insular minority of this country's population.").
112 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado constitutional
amendment banning anti-discrimination laws or policies protecting homosexuals because it was
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in Lawrence was based solely on moral disapproval of homosexuals,"'
Justice O'Connor applied "a more searching form of rational basis
review" in her concurring opinion to find it unconstitutional." 4  Re-
gardless of the level of scrutiny utilized by Justice O'Connor, none of
the other Justices joined in her opinion, so her opinion does not rep-
resent the holding of the Court. Therefore, the Court would not be
bound to follow it under stare decisis. However, it does provide some
persuasive authority for the Court in deciding a future challenge un-
der equal protection.
III. UNITED STATES V. MARCUM
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides Congress the ex-
clusive power to raise and regulate the armed forces."' Though this
provision does not exempt Congress's military regulations from judi-
cial review," 6 the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that, in matters relating to the military, the Court should give great
deference to legislative and executive judgments. 7 Within its powers
to regulate the armed forces, Congress created the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces 8 to act as a "Supreme Court" for the military."9
passed based solely on "'a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group'" (quoting
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
"3 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582-83 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
11 Id. at 580.
115 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces .... .").
11 See United States v.Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 430-31 (1960) ("[lit is apparent that the pro-
tections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inap-
plicable, are available to members of our armed forces.").
117 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("Our review of military regulations
challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of
similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1983) ("The special status of the military has required, the Constitution has contem-
plated, Congress has created, and this Court has long recognized two systems ofjustice, to some
extent parallel: one for civilians and one for military personnel."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) ("The case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national de-
fense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress
greater deference.").
11 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces was originally called the Court of Military Ap-
peals. See 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2000) (originally enacted in Pub. L. No. 81-506, art. 67, 64 Stat. 107,
129-30 (1950)) (establishing the Court of Military Appeals, which is now the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces).
11 See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962) (stat-
ing that Congress established the Court of Military Appeals as "a sort of civilian 'Supreme
Court' of the military.") (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 867, 876 (1958)). But see 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2000)
(limiting jurisdiction of Court of Appeal for the Armed Forces to criminal matters).
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As such, that court's decisions regarding military law are entitled to
significant deference from the United States Supreme Court.2 °
In United States v. Marcum, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces declared that the Lawrence decision applies to members of the
military in certain contexts."' The court in Marcum was faced with a
challenge to Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,1
22
which prohibits a member of the military from engaging in either
heterosexual or homosexual sodomy. In its analysis, the court ac-
knowledged that "Congress has indeed exercised its Article I author-
ity to address homosexual sodomy in the Armed Forces, but this oc-
curred prior to the Supreme Court's constitutional decision and
analysis in Lawrence.. . ."" Rejecting a facial challenge to Article 125
as overly broad, 24 the court announced a three-part inquiry to deter-
mine if Lawrence applies to a given situation:
First, was the conduct that the accused was found guilty of committing of
a nature to bring it within the liberty interest identified by the Supreme
Court? Second, did the conduct encompass any behavior or factors iden-
tified by the Supreme Court as outside the analysis -in Lawrence? Third,
are there additional factors relevant solely in the military environment
that affect the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty interest?1
2
5
The first question essentially asks if the conduct was "private, consen-
sual sexual activity between adults.1 2 6  The second question adds
some additional requirements, 1 27 the most important in the military
context being that the parties are not situated such that consent may
not be easily refused.1 2  Marcum did not identify any additional fac-
12 See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) ("Dealing with areas of law peculiar to
the military branches, the Court of Military Appeals' judgments are normally entitled to great
deference.").
121 United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
122 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).
123 Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206.
124 See id. ("[B]ecause Article 125 addresses both forcible and non-forcible sodomy, a facial
challenge reaches too far.").
125 Id. at 206-07 (internal citation omitted).
126 Id. at 207.
127 Lawrence notes the following elements about the relationship in the case:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be in-
jured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual per-
sons seek to enter.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
128 The military consistently regulates relationships between members of different ranks. See,
e.g., United States v. McCreight, 43 M.J. 483, 485 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("Since Revolutionary War
days, it has been considered unlawful for officers to drink alcohol with enlisted men in public
places and to treat them on terms of military equality."). Because of the nature of the military,
consent to a sexual relationship with a superior could not easily be refused by a subordinate;
thus, such a relationship falls outside the liberty interest identified in Lawrence. Marcum, 60 M.J.
at 206.
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tors relevant in the military environment that the court might con-
sider in its analysis, but subsequent cases have indicated that this fac-
tor relates to any relevant military regulations regarding romantic re-
lationships.'29 Thus, at the very least, Marcum indicates that private,
consensual sexual activity between a member of the military and a ci-
vilian where both are adults, and where the activity does not consti-
tute 1grostitution, is protected under Lawrence in the military con-
text.
On some level, Marcum creates a paradox. Marcum identified a
liberty interest that protects members of the military who engage in
homosexual sodomy under certain circumstances. However, the con-
sequences of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" necessitate that a member of
the military who exercises that liberty interest be separated from the
military. 3' How can one have a liberty interest in the military context
that, if exercised, would result in separation from the military? Of
course, some would rush to respond that there is no paradox at all, as
the liberty interest simply prevents one from being thrown in jail in-
stead of being thrown out of the military. Indeed, such a response
would be consistent with the jurisdiction of the C.A.A.F., which is lim-
ited to military criminal appeals. 32  However, simply because the
C.A.A.F. does not have jurisdiction over "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" does
not mean that its decisions regarding the treatment of homosexuals
by the military should be completely ignored. As the highest court
with exclusively military jurisdiction, the C.A.A.F. stands in a unique
position. It has tremendous experience in incorporating the distinct
requirements of the military into its adjudications, experience which
should not be ignored.
129 In United States v. Stirewalt, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
quoted Coast Guard regulations defining unacceptable romantic relationships in its discussion
of additional relevant factors in the military environment. 60 M.J. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1682 (2005). Other cases have similarly discussed the nature of the relation-
ship between the two parties engaging in the sexual conduct at issue in their discussion of addi-
tional relevant factors in the military context. See United States v. Bullock, No. 20030534 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (unpublished), petition for review denied, 61 M.J. 336 (C.A.A.F. 2005),
available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDNARTICLES/pdf-file/1961.pdf (noting that
the sexual conduct in question took place with a civilian); United States v. Barber, No.
20000413 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2004) (unpublished), petition for review denied, 60 M.J. 418
(C.A.A.F. 2004), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDNARTICLES/pdf file/
1960.pdf (noting that the sexual conduct in question "was between two soldiers of equivalent
rank").
ISO Though it is possible that the Marcum test may allow activity between two members of the
military to be protected under Lawrence in certain circumstances, such a conclusion is not nec-
essary for my analysis.
151 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2000) (requiring separation for those engaging in homosexual
acts of sodomy).
132 Id. § 867.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
Following Lawrence, the acts prong of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
could be challenged as either a violation of equal protection or due
process under the Fifth Amendment.'33 Under both challenges, the
Court would provide tremendous deference to Congress because
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a military regulation. 134 However, "defer-
ence does not mean abdication."1
5
A. Military Deference
In defending its deference to Congress regarding decisions about
the military, the Court has explained that it lacks competence to
make the "complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the com-
position, training, equipping, and control of a military force[, which]
are essentially professional military judgments" that would be neces-
sary to review such Congressional decisions.136 However, the C.A.A.F.
routinely must balance the interests of the military as a whole against
the constitutional fights of its members.17 As a court of exclusively
military jurisdiction, it has an innate "understanding of military cul-
ture and mission," superior to that of Congress. 13 In sum, the opin-
ion of the C.A.A.F. should be highly persuasive authority in matters of
military law.
In Marcum, the government argued that "Congress definitively
addressed homosexual sodomy by enacting 10 U.S.C. § 654," deter-
mining that it was "incompatible with military service.. The gov
ernment further argued that the "'presence in the armed forces of
persons who.., engage in homosexual acts would create an unac-
ceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and disci-
pline, and unit cohesion."1 40 Although not commenting on the con-
133 As "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a federal law, equal protection and due process analyses of
that law are governed by the Fifth Amendment. Although the Fifth Amendment does not have
an equal protection clause, the Court has implied a requirement of equal protection by the
federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (arguing that it would "be
unthinkable" that the Constitution imposes "a lesser duty on the Federal Government" than on
the states). The Court has also stated that "[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment
area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93
(1976).
1 See cases cited supra note 117.
135 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
136 Id. at 65 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
157 See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (stating that the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces has a practice of applying constitutional rights to areas "where
national security and constitutional rights are both paramount interests").
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2000)).
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stitutionality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the court did not accept this
argument as persuasive. Instead, the court noted that, although
Congress had exercised its legislative power to address homosexual
sodomy through "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," it had done so at a time
when Bowers was the controlling law.14 ' Furthermore, the court re-
jected the government's narrow characterization of the liberty inter-
est identified in Lawrence as a right to homosexual sodomy, quoting
the Supreme Court's own language. 142  Because "[c]onstitutional
rights identified by the Supreme Court generally apply to members of
the military unless by text or scope they are plainly inapplicable," the
court determined through a balancing test that accounted for "the
nuance of military life" that Lawrence should be applicable to the mili-
tary in cases that satisfy its three-part inquiry. 4 3 Because of the inti-
mate familiarity that the C.A.A.F. has obtained over the years by ap-
plying laws exclusively in the military context, its decision to accept
the Lawrence decision in the military context should be treated as
highly persuasive and act as a counterbalance to the deference af-
forded to Congress by the Court.
B. Government as Employer
Members of the military are government employees. As such, they
cannot be fired "for a reason that infringes upon constitutionally pro-
tected rights."'" Though the majority of cases dealing with this issue
involve infringement of freedom of speech, one can analogize the
present issue to that line of cases. Under an ordinary freedom of
speech case involving a governmental employer, an employee must
show that "his conduct was constitutionally protected" and that the
conduct was a motivating factor in the employee's termination. 145
The employee must also show the speech involved "a matter of public
concern. ' 46 If it does, the Court must balance the interests of the
employee's First Amendment rights against "'the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
141 Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206.
142 Id. ("'To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual con-
duct demeans the claim the individual put forward[.]") (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 567 (2003)).
143 Id.
1 Kermit Roosevelt, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment in the
Administrative State, 106YALE L.J. 1233, 1235 (1997).
1 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
1 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 (1987).
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performs through its employees.",147 By comparison, the Court has
not applied this test in freedom of speech cases involving members of
the military. Instead, the Court has analyzed the issue as a matter of
military necessity, imposing a much more exacting standard, and giv-
ing the proper deference to congressional action. 48 Such an analysis
implicitly incorporates the traditional public employer analysis, utiliz-
ing military necessity as a compelling state interest that must be bal-
anced against the constitutional rights of individuals in the military.
Thus, for purposes of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the government-as-
employer issue can be addressed through congressional deference to
the matters of the military.
C. Equal Protection Challenge
Although previous challenges to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" under
the Equal Protection Clause have failed, that does not necessarily pre-
clude a successful equal protection challenge today. 149 At the time
that previous equal protection challenges were brought against
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Bowers was the controlling law and was cited
as justification for applying rational basis review to laws discriminat-
ing against homosexuals. 5  Since Lawrence has overruled Bowers, the
failure of previous challenges does not preclude a successful equal
protection challenge today nor does it preclude a finding by the
Court that homosexuals constitute a suspect class."'
The Court has recognized two forms of heightened scrutiny in
Equal Protection Clause cases: strict scrutiny and intermediate scru-
tiny. 55 The criteria for applying these levels of scrutiny have not been
clearly defined by the Court.' However, the Court has alluded to
147 Id. at 388 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
148 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980) ("Both Congress and this Court have
found that the special character of the military requires civilian authorities to accord military
commanders some flexibility in dealing with matters that affect internal discipline and mo-
rale.").
149 See supra notes 4, 11-12 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1426 & n.ll (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1986)) (denying application of heightened scrutiny under
equal protection); see also Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Although I must follow that decision [Philips] here, I note that it is
necessarily rooted in Bowers v. Hardwick... .").
151 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers).
152 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 645-46 (2d
ed. 2002) ("All laws not subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny are evaluated under the ra-
tional basis test.").
153 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think we
can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny whenever we feel like
it .... )
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several justifications for the application of strict scrutiny, which in-
clude a long history of past discrimination154 and possessing an immu-
table trait. ' Homosexuals possess both of these characteristics.
Homosexuals have been sul ected to a range of discriminatory acts in
the distant and recent past, ' including being categorized as mentally
157 158ill,' 57 incarcerated for not remaining celibate, and excluded from
hate crime legislation despite being targets of such crimes.' It is also
generally accepted that homosexuals cannot change their sexual ori-
entation. However, even if there was some method of altering sex-
ual orientation, it certainly would be more difficult to change than
alienage, another suspect classification, for those aliens eligible for
U.S. citizenship.
6'
The criteria that distinguish the application of intermediate scru-
tiny from that of strict scrutiny are even less clear. What is clear is
154 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-08 (1879) (arguing that equal pro-
tection is necessary to combat historical prejudices).
155 See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1977) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Presump-
tively, such a minority group [for which strict scrutiny is appropriate] is one identifiable by a
status over which the members are powerless.").
156 See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985), denying cert. to 730
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[H]omosexuals have historically been the
object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against ho-
mosexuals is 'likely... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than ... rationality.'" (quoting
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982))).
157 See Note, Regulating Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Pathologization Problem, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2770, 2786 (2005) ("In 1952, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) listed homo-
sexuality as a mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Mental Disorders (DSM-1),
the profession's standard nosology .... Not until 1973... did the APA delete homosexuality
from its nomenclature.").
158 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) ("[Blefore 1961 all 50 states had out-
lawed sodomy[.]"); Gertrude Samuels, The Fight for Civil Liberties Never Stays Won, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1966, at 14 (noting that the New York City police commissioner had to be "per-
suaded.., to issue orders forbidding plainclothesmen to entice homosexuals into illegal acts
for the sake of making arrests").
19 Compare Kevin Sack, 2 Confess to Killing Man, Saying He Made a Sexual Advance, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1999, at A1O (describing a hate crime against a gay man in Alabama), with ALA. CODE §
13A-5-13(a) (1) (2005) (protecting people from threats based on "race, color, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, or physical or mental disability," but not sexual orientation).
160 Every major mental health organization in the United States has released statements
warning that there is no evidence that so-called "reparative therapy" can change a person's sex-
ual orientation and that such therapy can actually be harmful. Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay
Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homo-
sexual to Heterosexual Orientation, 32(5) ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 403, 404 (2003). Never-
theless, experts disagree on whether homosexuality is an immutable characteristic. See Warren
Throckmorton, Initial Empirical and Clinical Findings Concerning the Change Process for Ex-Gays,
33(3) PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 242, 247 (2002) ("[M]any mental health professionals be-
lieve same-gender sexual orientation cannot be changed but ... others believe change is possi-
ble.").
161 SeeNyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 8-9 & n.ll (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to a law that
discriminated against only those aliens who were eligible for, but nonetheless refused to apply
for, citizenship).
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that the Court uses intermediate scrutiny to examine cases of dis-
crimination based on sex or illegitimacy. 62 Beyond that, the Court
has said little about when intermediate scrutiny should be applied.
However, academics have postulated that intermediate scrutiny,
rather than strict scrutiny, is appropriate for cases of gender dis-
crimination for several reasons, including: (1) the Fourteenth
Amendment was initially meant only to outlaw racial discrimination,
(2) the existence of biological differences between men and women
makes it more likely that classifications based on sex are warranted,
and (3) women are a political majority. 63  Of these three, only the
first applies to homosexuals. Homosexuals are by no means a politi-
cal majority'6 4 nor are differences between heterosexuals and homo-
sexuals generally a legitimate basis for legislation differentiating the
two. 65 Although the Fourteenth Amendment was not initially meant
to apply to homosexuals, this alone should not disqualify classifica-
tion based on sexual orientation from being subject to strict scrutiny,
as the same can be said about alienage, to which the Court has ap-
plied strict scrutiny.66  Even if the Court were to recognize homo-
sexuals as a protected class, the Court would still provide deference to
Congress in matters relating to military regulations. 67  Because
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" would also infringe upon the fundamental
right identified in Lawrence, a due process challenge to that law would
likely be more successful.
D. Due Process Challenge
Putting aside the Court's deference to Congress for a moment,
Congress's actions would fail any sort of heightened scrutiny. In en-
acting "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Congress made fifteen separate find-
ings, which are codified in the law itself.'66 Among these findings,
Congress determined that success in combat depended most on unit
162 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("Between these extremes of rational basis re-
view and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.").
163 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 728.
164 See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 n.7 (1985), denying cert. to
730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[Hiomosexuals may constitute from 8-
15% of the average population.").
165 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (challenging Colorado statute that prohib-
ited inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected class in anti-discrimination policies or laws);
Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 ("[I]t is fair to say that discrimination against homosexuals is
'likely... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than... rationality.'" (quoting Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982))).
1 SeeNyquist, 432 U.S. at 8-9 & n.l (1977).
167 See cases cited supra note 117.
168 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2000) (listing fifteen findings of Congress).
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cohesion and that the presence of homosexuals in the military would
create an unacceptable risk to unit cohesion. 69 In suits challenging
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the government has reiterated this justifica-
tion to maintain the policy.7° However, the actions of the military
suggest other, invidious motives.
During congressional hearings preceding the enactment of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," members of the military argued that allowing openly
gay soldiers in the military would be "immensely disruptive" to a
unit 17 and would "be just too detrimental to [the] combat readiness
of the squadron or the unit.''7  Former General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf agreed:
[I1n my years of military service I have experienced the fact that the in-
troduction of an open homosexual into a small unit immediately polar-
izes that unit and destroys the very bonding that is so important for the
unit['s] survival in time of war.
[Ifn every case that I am familiar with ... unit effectiveness suffered.
173Plain and simply, that has been my experience.
Congress codified this justification for excluding homosexuals from
the military in "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."74 Because Congress's concern
1 Id. §§ 654(a)(7), 654(a)(15).
170 See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
("The primary justification proferred for the 'don't ask/don't tell' policy is 'unit cohesion.'
'Good morale,' 'discipline,' and the ability to recruit and retain military personnel are related
sub-interests."); see also Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998) ("In this litiga-
tion, the United States has justified § 654's prohibition on homosexual conduct on the basis
that it promotes unit cohesion, enhances privacy and reduces sexual tension.") (emphasis added);
Philips, 106 F.3d at 1429 ("Here, the Navy has explained that in its judgment separating mem-
bers who engage in homosexual acts is necessary to further military effectiveness by maintaining
unit cohesion, accommodating personal privacy and reducing sexual tension.") (emphasis
added); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 927 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In the end, alternatives to
["Don't Ask, Don't Tell"] were rejected because 'the maintenance of military unit cohesion-
which is the key to combat capability-.., must remain paramount over the desires of a single
individual or group.'") (citation omitted); Transcript of Motion to Dismiss at 7, Cook v. Rums-
feld, CA No. 04-12546-GAO (D. Mass. July 8, 2005), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-
data/SLDNARTICLES/pdffile/2275.pdf (arguing that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" be upheld
because "what Congress found is that the core of military readiness is the importance of unit
cohesion").
171 Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Ser-
vices, 103d Cong. 539 (1993) (statement of Lt. John Burnham, U.S. Navy), available at
httg2//dont.stanford.edu/hearings/Hearings5-10-93.pdf.
Id. at 556 (statement of Lt. Fred Frey, U.S. Navy), available at
httg://dont.stanford.edu/hearings/Hearings5-10-93.pdf.
Id. at 595-96 (statement of Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret.)) (emphasis added),
available at http://dont.stanford.edu/hearings/Hearings5-11-93.pdf.
174 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(6) (2000) ("Success in combat requires military units that are
characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion."); id. § 654(a) (7)
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about maintaining unit cohesion was based on ensuring the effec-
tiveness of units in combat, the government's interest in unit cohesion
would be at its apogee in times of armed conflict when units are most
likely to engage in combat. Since the major purported purpose of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is to promote unit cohesion, one would ex-
pect that in times of war, it would be more likely to be enforced.
However, the military does the exact opposite; it discharges signifi-
cantly fewer homosexuals in times of war than in times of peace.
Between 1994 and 2001, the year in which the United States went
to war in Afghanistan, homosexual discharges under "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" increased in "every year but one. 176 In 2002, "the first full
year America was at war," "' the number of homosexual discharges
under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" decreased by almost thirty percent
from the previous year. 17  In 2003, the number of discharges de-
creased even further, down about fifteen percent from the number of
discharges in 2002.179 In fact, homosexual discharges from the mili-
tary have decreased "every time America has entered a war."'80
Though the members of the military have limited rights as compared
to civilians, the rights they do have cannot be taken away without at
least a rational reason,'81 and the military's actions are the very defini-
ion of irrational.8 2 How can a law guarded by military necessity sur-
vive when the military's actions show that it is not necessary at all?' s
("One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion .... ") (emphasis
added).
175 See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. By contrast, the total number of discharges
from the military resulting from general and special courts-martial were higher in 2002 and 2003
than in 2001. See Annual Reports of the Code Committee on MilitaryJustice, Fiscal Years 2001-
03, available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/Annual.htm.
176 Nathaniel Frank, Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Gays and Lesbians
at War: Military Service in Iraq and Afghanistan Under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" 40 (2004),
available at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/Frank091504-GaysAtWar.doc.
177 Id.
178 See CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL,
DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS" 1 (2004), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-
data/SLDN_- ARTICLES/pdf_- file/141 1.pdf (displaying discharges per year under "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" as a bar graph).
179 See id. (same).
18 Id.
15' See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980) ("While it is clear that one
does not surrender his or her constitutional rights upon entering the military, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that constitutional rights must be viewed in light of the special cir-
cumstances and needs of the armed forces.").
182 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 834 (7th ed. 1999) (defining irrational as "[n]ot guided by
reason or by a fair consideration of the facts").
183 See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[S]eparating members who en-
gage in homosexual acts is necessary to further military effectiveness. ... ").
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In the face of such data, the government may base its argument to
uphold "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" on another of Congress's findings.
That is, the government may argue that "[t] here is no constitutional
right to serve in the armed forces [,]y 184 so there can be no deprivation
of a constitutional right by prohibiting homosexuals from serving in
the military. While Justice Holmes might have agreed with such a
statement, 185 the Supreme Court has firmly rejected such reasoning.1
6
Denial of military service to homosexuals denies them public em-•187
ployment, not to mention a myriad of benefits granted to veterans,
which can only be obtained through service in the military.88 As Law-
rence recognizes a constitutional right that protects homosexuals who
engage in certain acts of sodomy, depriving them of military service
for exercising that right would be a deprivation of a governmental
benefit. This deprivation would have to survive strict scrutiny to be
constitutional. Historical discharge data indicates that the reasons
proffered by Congress in support of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" are pre-
textual. 's9 Moreover, the restrictions are not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government purpose. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
does not simply prevent homosexuals from participating in combat
roles, 90 where unit cohesion is relevant; it is an absolute bar to service
for any homosexual with a "propensity to engage in... homosexual
184 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2) (2000).
185 In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, Justice Holmes stated in dictum that a police officer
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a po-
liceman." 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
186 See, e.g., Bd. of Commr's, Wabaunsee City v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (noting
that "precedents have long since rejected Justice Holmes' famous dictum"); see also Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[Elven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons ..... [i]t may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests ... ").
187 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 ("[M]ost often, we have applied the principle [that the govern-
ment may not deny a person a valuable benefit for exercising a constitutional right] to denials
of public employment.").
188 See generally FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS AND DEPENDENTS (2006), available at
http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/vadocs/fedben.pdf (discussing benefits available to veterans and their
dependents).
189 See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text (describing how data demonstrates a de-
crease in homosexual discharges during wartime, when unit cohesion is most important).
190 The prohibition on military service under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" extends even to em-
ployment as ajudge advocate. See 10 U.S.C. § 801(13) (2000) (definingjudge advocate); see also
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (upholding
a law denying universities federal funding if law schools prevented military recruiters from hav-
ing equal access to students for on-campus recruiting, even though doing so violated the
schools' nondiscrimination policies).
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acts."' 91 For these reasons, it is unlikely that the law would survive
strict scrutiny.
This is not to suggest that the Court's deference to congressional
decisions regarding the military can be ignored. However, the Court
should not blindly defer to congressional decisions, either. As previ-
ously noted, the Court defers to Congress because it lacks the ability
to make complex judgments about the military that would be neces-
sary to review such congressional decisions.' 92 However, the C.A.A.F.
regularly must make subtle judgments that incorporate the special
circumstances of military life. The C.A.A.F. made such a judgment in
Marcum and designed a three-part inquiry to determine when Law-
rence should be applicable in the military context. 193 Thus, when the
Court considers whether a congressional law regulating the military
infringes on the fundamental right identified in Lawrence, it should
consider the C.A.A.F.'s opinion in Marcum highly persuasive because
the C.A.A.F. has the expertise that the Court lacks in making judicial
evaluations of military matters. If the Court applies the C.A.A.F.'s
three-part test, it would be unconstitutional to enforce the acts prong
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the limited circumstances where Law-
rence is applicable under the Marcum test.
94
If the Court determined that such as-applied challenges would be
successful, the statements prong of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" could be
successfully challenged facially.' 95 Previous challenges of the state-
ments prong failed because the courts concluded that it was rational
to assume a homosexual will engage in homosexual conduct.' 96 This,
in turn, would violate the acts prong, under which discharge was al-
ways constitutional. 97 However, if there are cases when homosexual
conduct would not result in discharge under the acts prong, this
would no longer be the case. This would renew the viability of a First
Amendment challenge of the statements prong.
191 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2) (2000).
192 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
193 United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 206-07 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
194 See supra text accompanying note 130.
195 Such a challenge would likely have the greatest practical effect on the military's policy, as
the majority of those discharged under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" were discharged under the state-
ments prong. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL COSTS
AND LOSs OF CRITICAL SKILLs DUE TO DOD's HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY CANNOT BE
COMPLETELY ESTIMATED 11 fig. 3 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05299.pdf [hereinafter MILITARY PERSONNEL] (stating that eighty-three percent of discharges
under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" between 1994 and 2003 were under the "statements" prong).
196 See supra note 15.
197 See supra notes 4, 11-13, and accompanying text.
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E. First Amendment
First Amendment rights, like many other rights of members of the
military, are substantially more restricted when compared to those of
civilians.1 98 Still, statutes passed under Congress's powers to regulate
the military can be invalidated for being overly broad, as the Court
did in United States v. Robel.'9 In Robel, the Court struck down a statute
that prohibited Communists from working "in any defense facility.
°200
Though the government justified the statute under Congress's "war
power," the Court held that the statute unconstitutionally burdened
the First Amendment rights of individuals.2 0 ' By requiring discharge
of any homosexual who makes an affirmative statement about his or
her sexual orientation at any time, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" oversteps
the powers of Congress.2 0 2 Prior cases found no constitutional viola-
tion because the statute did not "target mere status or speech."0 3
Rather, the courts argued, it used speech as evidence that one will
engage in impermissible conduct.2 0 4 This justification breaks down
when stating "I am gay" is no longer indicative that one will necessar-
ily engage in unsuitable conduct. It would not be difficult for a ho-
mosexual member of the military to limit sexual activity to those cir-
cumstances when Lawrence would apply in the military context. In
fact, most homosexual members of the military already do so.20 5 A
statute that punishes a member of the military for stating that he or
she will engage in conduct that is constitutionally protected would
198 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("While the members of the military are
not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those pro-
tections.").
1 389 U.S. 258, 260 (1967).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 263, 266.
2 Under 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2), stating that one is a homosexual will result in discharge
unless that individual can show that he or she does not have "a propensity to engage
in... homosexual acts." Having a propensity to engage in homosexual acts is the very charac-
teristic that defines a homosexual orientation.
203 Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 263 (8th Cir. 1996); accord, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80
F.3d 915, 931 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The statute does not target speech declaring homosexuality;
rather, it targets homosexual acts.. . and permissibly uses the speech as evidence.").
204 E.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931.
205 See MILITARY PERSONNEL, supra note 195, at 11 (illustrating that only seventeen percent of
those discharged under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" actually engaged in some sort of homosexual
conduct). Though the data only discriminates between same-sex marriage and other homosex-
ual conduct, only one percent of discharges were for same-sex marriage violations. The remain-
ing sixteen percent may or may not have involved activity protected under Lawrence and
Marcum. Id.
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surely be found to be unconstitutionally overbroad, as Robel indi-
cates.
V. CONCLUSION
Though Congress is entitled to deference in regulating the mili-
tary, the Court should not blindly accept "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in
its constitutional analysis. The Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, which routinely must integrate the unique demands of mili-
tary life, has determined that Lawrence applies in the military context
when the facts of the situation satisfy a three-part test. Though the
Court may lack the necessary skill to incorporate military interests in
its constitutional analysis, the C.A.A.F. does not. For this reason, its
holding in Marcum should be viewed by the Court as highly persua-
sive.
Adoption of the three-part test created by the court in Marcum for
determining if an action is protected by Lawrence in the military con-
text would significantly reduce the number of constitutional dis-
charges from the military under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Application
of the Marcum test to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" would result in a greater
set of instances where it would be unconstitutional to discharge a
member of the military for homosexual conduct. However, even
more significantly, the protection of homosexual conduct that satis-
fies the Marcum test would no longer necessarily mean that it is rea-
sonable to assume that a homosexual will engage in conduct that can
be constitutionally proscribed by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." As the ma-
jority of discharges under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" are for statements
indicating a homosexual orientation, adoption of the Marcum test by
the Court would eliminate the de facto proscription against homo-
sexuals in the military.
W6 See 389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967) (holding that, although it is within Congress's discretion to
create laws limiting access to military factories, the law itself was unconstitutional because it
overburdened the First Amendment).
